Strategic priorities and dilemmas: Iran, Russia, and ISIS

Strategic priorities and dilemmas

The recent nuclear deal with Iran must rank as one of President Obama’s signature achievements. In spite of the determined opposition to this agreement from both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the demagogic domestic attacks coming from the right-wing Israeli lobby and all of the Republican Presidential candidates (plus the embarrassment of Chuck Schumer’s opposition), Obama and Kerry persevered in the negotiation of the effective de-nuclearization of Iran. This served as evidence of the possibility of negotiations as an effective tool to advance perceived national interest – for both parties to the conflict – while removing a potentially serious nuclear threat to the Middle East, if not far more broadly. But by so doing, the way is open for Iran to play a much larger role in world affairs, both economically and politically -/ and that is clearly what concerns both the Israelis and the Saudis, not to speak of other right-wing and militaristic forces.

But it is here that the Obama administration seems caught in a strategic (and perhaps, conceptual) bind. They seem unable to recognize and publicly work with Iran in countering their common enemy, ISIS. How much of Obama’s reluctance in this matter, results from his fear of domestic political vulnerability coming from Republican attacks, and how much from his administration’s fear of what Iran’s increasing power in the Middle East will do to US allies such as the Saudis, is not clear? And how much follows from Obama’s unwillingness to postpone his determination to remove Assad from power in Syria? U.S. Mid-East policy seems stuck in an untenable rut. They have as a primary objective — with support from our European allies – to destroy ISIS. But they cannot seem to recognize that this objective requires postponing the removal of Assad, who, however morally disreputable, remains one of the few sources — along with the Kurds – of actual “boots on the ground” that all know is essential if ISIS is to be destroyed. Further, removing Assad now would simply repeat the disaster of Libya, by contributing to an expanded vacuum of power in much of Syria.

But here it seems that wider political considerations are also at work, as the U.S. not only cannot openly and effectively coordinate anti-ISIS activity with the natural ally in thus effort that would be Iran, but even more, it cannot do likewise with its other major natural ally, namely Russia. Both Iran and Russia are directly targeted by ISIS, and have the overwhelming objective of defeating them. If we could free ourselves of conceptual blinders, or countervailing national alliances and objectives, we could develop a coordinated campaign with such potentially effective partners as to stand a real chance of destroying ISIS. But that would, of course,, have the effect of significantly increasing Iran and Russia’s “clout” in that area, and this to the detriment of our reactionary oil allies there, as well as the right-wing and expansionist Israeli establishment.

Thus the U.S. continues to insist that Assad must go, while seeking to build up an effectively non-existent “moderate” opposition, and refusing to coordinate with the effective opposition that the Iranians and Russians (who, of course, are the main international supports of Assad) can provide. And thus they significantly undermine what should be their primary objective, defeating ISIS. And this need to reframe the primary objective in the Middle East is one that is understood by the Europeans. It was explicitly expressed recently by French President Holland, who changed his prior insistence that Assad must go right away. And I was pleased to see this realistic strategy endorsed by Bernie Sanders in last night’s debate — though not by Hillary Clinton — although Sanders seemed reluctant to state it too forcefully, perhaps because it could be so controversial domesticity to say anything positive about a public military coordination with Iran and Russia. But such a re-prioritization of US policy is a vital and strategic necessity, if the battle against ISIS is to be won.

This Post Has One Comment

  1. ramund

    The Russians are expecting Assad to go. Only they don’t want to make him go but rather let him invent the idea, give way and so he goes honorably all by himself. The Russians talk about this though not to Assad. Russia doesn’t fight ISIS, it just makes a mess as best it can. Were USA ever to admit to ignore the fact and go with Russia, now that would be the end. Of the world.

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